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THE POLICY, LAW, AND FACTS OF 
COPYRIGHTING COMPUTER SCREEN 
DISPLAYS: AN ESSAY 
by LT. HARDY· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Commentators in both the academic l and popular2 press frequently 
debate the issue of whether the "look and feel" of a computer pro-
• Associate Professor of Law. College of William & Mary. Williamsburg. Virginia. 
1. See. e.g .• Bendekgey. Copyright Protection for Computer Software Visual Dis-
plal/s.' Protecting a Program's Look and Feel. 6 SoFTWARE PROTECTION 1 (1988); Bixby. 
SlI'Ithesis and Originality in Computer Screen Displays and User Interfaces: The "Look 
OM Feel" Cases. 27 WILLAME'ITE L. REV. 31 (1991); Friedman. Copyrighting Machine Lan-
gwage Computer Software-The Case Against. 9 CoMPUTER/L.J. 1 (1989); Hazen. Contract 
Principles as a Guide for Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in Computer Software: 
The Limits of Copyright Protection, the Evolving Concept of Derivative Works. and the 
Proper Limits of Licensing Agreements. 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 105 (1986); Menell. An 
AnalJlSi& of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs. 41 STAN. L. REv. 
100 (1989); Mueller • .Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer/User 
Inter/aces. 9 CoMPUTER/L.J. 37 (1989); Stern. Legal Protection of Screen Displays and 
Other User Interfaces for Computers: A Problem in Balancing Incentives for Crention 
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OM the Law Collide-Look and Feel Copyright Evolves. 16 WEST. ST. UNIV. L . REV. 183 
(1988) . 
2. Burke, Xeroa; Joins Technology-Licensing Fray; Campaign Centers on "Look and 
Feel" of Graphical User Interfaces, PC WEEK, May 29, 1989, at 69; Cocoran, Look But 
Don't Touch: Software Companies Battle Over Intellectual Property Rights, SCI. AM., 
Sept., 1989. at 101; Jerome, "Power to Programmers," Picketers Tell Lotus; Protest Over 
Look-oM-Feel LawllUits, PC-COMPUTING. Sept .• 1989, at 43; Samuelson, Why the Look and 
Feel of Software User Interfaces Should Not Be Protected by Copyright Law, COM. ACM, 
May,1989, at 563; Veronis. Pirates Walk the Plank in Look and Feel Case. BOSTON Bus. J ., 
Mar. 13, 1989, at 1. 
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gram-how it appears to the human user of the program---can be the 
subject of copyright protection. The debate will surely be fueled by re-
cent court decisions dealing with the copyright protection of various ele-
ments of a screen display.3 
As applied particularly to the visual displays of a program seen by a 
user on the computer's screen, this debate is unnecessary: the screen 
displays of computer programs are clearly and unquestionably the 
proper subject of copyright protection. Judicial resolution of the issue 
has never been necessary or desirable. The root of judicial and schol-
arly misconception about copyright's application to screen displays, 
namely that there is anything to debate at all, has been a failure to sep-
arate the distinct questions of policy, law, and fact that govern any 
copyright inquiry. 
Whether the screen displays of a computer program are copyright-
able is a question of law involving copyright's subject matter; the an-
swer turns on an interpretation of the 1976 Copyright Act and its 
legislative history. Whether these displays should be copyrightable is a 
question of copyright policy; the answer to that question turns on the 
economics of the copyright incentive and an assessment of public 
benefits. 
Whether a particular computer program's screen displays can be 
copyrighted turns on the tests of copyright protection, namely original-
ity and fixation, and is highly fact dependent. Whether a given pro-
gram's displays are in/ringed by another program's is similarly a fact 
dependent question that turns on a comparison of the two programs. 
II. SUBJECT MA TIER OF PATENTS AND THE 
COPYRIGHT ANALOGY 
A distinction between policy and law is obvious, but the distinctions 
among copyright subject matter, tests, and infringement may not be so 
obvious. These distinctions are clearer in patent law, which offers an 
informative parallel. 
To be patented, an invention must fit one of the categories of pat-
entable "subject matter": it must be either a machine, an article of 
manufacture, a composition of matter, or a process.4 The invention 
3. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Copy L. Rep. (CCH) 26,903, 
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5986 (April 14, 1992) (denying infringement of various elements of 
the Apple Macintosh screen displays by the Microsoft Windows program ); Brown Bag 
Software v. Symantec Corp., 22 U.S.P .Q.2d (BNA) 1429, Copy. L. Rep. (CCH ) ~26,896, 1992 
U.S. App. LEXIS 6154 (April 7, 1992) (affirming summary judgment against plaintiff 
claiming copyright infringement in the screen displays of an "outlining program); Lotus 
Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990) (finding 
infringement of the "menu" of commands ne<:essary to operate the Lotus 1-2-3 program). 
4. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
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must also meet a separate set of "tests" of patentability: novelty, utility, 
and non-obviousness.5 A telephone, for example, is appropriate subject 
matter for a patent because it is an "article of manufacture" (or a 
machine). So is a carburetor or a laser. The chemical compound known 
as nylon also fits within patentable subject matter, as does any distinct 
chemical compound, because it is a "composition of matter." 
Despite being clearly within the category of patentable subject mat-
ter, however, none of the things just listed could actually receive a pat-
ent today because they all fail to pass one or more tests of patentability. 
Telephones, carburetors, lasers, and nylon all fail to meet the test of 
"novelty": they have been invented already and are no longer new. A 
brand new chemical compound with unknown properties would meet 
the "novelty" test, but would fail to meet the "utility" test: if it had no 
known use, it could not be "useful" and could not for that reason re-
ceive a patent.6 
The key point about patent law is that to receive protection, an in-
vention must meet both the general "subject matter" requirement and 
also satisfy the particular "test" requirements. 
Copyright law operates similarly. Although there is some confu-
sion over this point,7 copyright's "subject matter" is works of author-
5. Id. §§ 101. 102, 103. 
6. See Brenner v. Manson. 383 U.S. 519. 528-36 (1965). 
7. The Copyright Act seems to define subject matter as a concept that encompasses 
as one the concepts that I separate: subject matter and tests. The Act says. under the 
heading "The Subject Matter of Copyright," that "Copyright protection subsists ... in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression ... from which 
they can be perceived. reproduced. or otherwise communicated." 17 U .S.C. § 102. By in-
cluding all three concepts in one undifferentiated section. the Act's text implies that sub-
ject matter, originality. and fixation constitute a unitary concept. 
The House Report on the Copyright Act is more ambiguous. The Report first indi-
cates that "subject matter" is not a unitary concept, but rather has two separate compo-
nents. originality and fixation: it discusses the "General subject matter of copyright" 
under those two headings: "Original works of authorship" and "Fixation in tangible 
form. " H.R. REP. No. 94-1476. at 51. 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & A D-
MIN. NEWS 5659-61 (hereinafter House Report). Yet the Report goes on to identify subject 
matter with originality. but not with fixation. when it notes that the "phrase ... original 
works of authorship .. . characteriz[es) the general subject matter of statutory copyright 
protection." Id. at 51. This wording suggests that subject matter and originality constitute 
a unitary concept. different from the requirement of fixation. 
If that were not enough. the Report begins the discussion of originality by referring 
to "[t)he two fundamental criteria of copyright protection" as being originality and fixa-
tion, without referring to the concept of subject matter of "work." thereby suggesting that 
the subject matter question is separate from the tests ("criteria") of originality and fixa-
tion as I argue. ld. at 51 (emphasis added). 
This notion is confirmed in the discussion of section 301. the preemption provision. 
where the Report explicitly distinguishes copyright's "subject matter" from the originality 
requirement: "As long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter categories 
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ship.S Copyright's "test" are originality and funtion in a tangible 
medium. 9 
The subject matter question applies to whole categories of things. 
"Novels," for example, fall into the category of "literary works" and for 
that reason one can say unequivocally that as literary works, novels are 
copyrightable subject matter. Whether a category of "things" falls 
within the subject matter of copyright is a legal determination because 
it requires an answer to a legal question: are the things "works of 
authorship?" 
In contrast to the subject matter requirement, the tests of original-
ity and fixation can only be assessed in regard to particular works of au-
thorship. That is, they are primarily questions of fact, turning on the 
amount of originality and the degree of fixation of a given work. In 
practice, they are not difficult. "Originality" means no more than that a 
given work has not been copied.10 Fixation means merely that a work 
be "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration."ll Though it raises some theoretical questions,12 the require-
ment of fixation seldom raises any serious questions in real cases. 
Though "novels" are within the subject matter of copyright, for ex-
ample, a given novel that is simply copied from someone else cannot be 
copyrighted by the copier because it fails to meet the test of "original-
ity." Likewise, a novel that exists only in the mind of its author-no 
of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from protecting it even if . .. it is too 
minimal or lacking in originality to qualify" for copyright protection. Id. at 131 (empha-
sis added). In other words, the Report here allows for the fact that a work may be a part 
of copyright's subject matter, but not be "original," clearly implying that the two concepts 
are distinct. The Act and the HOtUJe Report are not, in short, models of clarity on the 
question of the differences between "subject matter," "originality," and "fixation." 
I offer my own rationalization-that "subject matter" and the "tests" of protection, 
originality and fixation, are distinct-as preferable to the confusion reflected in the Act 
and its Report. Doing so greatly clarifies my argument, but is not essential to my 
conclusions. 
8. The Act does not define "works of authorship," Bee House Report, at 51 (''The 
phrase 'original works of authorship' ... is purposely left undefined."), but illustrates the 
concept with a list that includes literary works; musical works; dramatic works; 
pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion 
picture and other audiovisual works; and sound recordings. 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
9. "Originality" means that a work must have originated with the author. "Fixa-
tion" means that the work must be sufficiently recorded in some medium that it can be 
reproduced. 
10. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1903); Durham 
Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F .2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980); Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. 
Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); Alfred 
Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951). 
11. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
12. Is a poem written in the sand of a beach for a moment "fixed?" 
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matter that the author can recite it word for word-cannot be copy-
righted because it fails the test of fixation in a tangible medium, though 
it clearly meets the subject matter requirement. 
The essential infringement question is whether the defendant exer-
cised one or more of the rights granted exclusively to the plaintiff copy-
right owner. In practice, look-and-feel cases have invoked the two most 
common copyright rights: the right to reproduce and the right to dis-
tribute to the public the copyrighted work of authorship. Typically, 
then, screen display infringement comes down to a question of whether 
one display copied "too much" from another display. Like the issues of 
originality and fixation, this issue is largely one of fact; it can only be 
assessed in the context of two particular works, compared side by side. 
Copyright litigation potentially raises all four issues: first, does the 
plaintiff's work fit into one of the categories of copyrightable subject 
matter? Second, if the answer to this question is uncertain, then as a 
matter of copyright policy, should the plaintiff's work fall under copy-
right's protection? Third, does the plaintiff's work meet the tests of 
copyright protection- originality and fixation? And finally, does the 
defendant's use of a work infringe any of the plaintiff's copyright 
rights? 
I t is crucial that courts address these questions in the order shown. 
The first question is whether the "thing" in issue in litigation falls 
within copyright's subject matter. If the statute is clear on this point, 
there is no warrant for undertaking a policy analysis. When Congress 
has decided, for example, that "literary works" are appropriate for 
copyright's subject matter, Congress has foreclosed courts from recon-
sidering this same question de novo in regard to something that is 
unarguably a "literary work." 
This result seems so plainly dictated by notions of separation of 
powers and the need for predictability in the application of statutes that 
one can hardly argue the contrary. Only when a "thing" is not clearly 
within or without copyright's subject matter should a court address pol-
icy concerns to make its determination. is 
For litigation over screen displays, then, the questions are first, do 
screen displays fall within the subject matter of the Copyright Act? 
Second, if that question is not clear. is it advisable that they do so? 
Third, do the screen displays of a given computer program meet the re-
quirements of originality and fixation? And finally, are the screen dis-
plays of a given program so substantially copied that the copies infringe 
the rights of the original program's copyright owner? 
The rest of this article will show that even a casual reading of the 
13. Policy arguments are also appropriately made, of course, to Congress itself to 
change a statute whose application is clear but perhaps inadvisable. 
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Copyright Act answers the first of these questions affirmatively: screen 
displays clearly fall within copyright's subject matter. Policy arguments 
about displays are therefore inappropriate for judicial consideration. 
Even as made to Congress. however. the usual policy arguments against 
including screen displays within copyright's subject matter are badly 
flawed; they do not stack up against the strong arguments for including 
screen displays within copyright's protection. 
A. Issue 1: Do Screen Displays Fall Within Copyright 's Subject 
Matter? 
Whether computer screen displays fall within copyright's subject 
matter is easily answered: 0/ course they do. They are either "pictorial 
or graphic" works. or they are "audiovisual works," both of which cate-
gories of copyrightable subject matter are explicitly listed in the Copy-
right Act.Jot 
Courts easily reached this conclusion for the displays of video 
games, IS perhaps because of their similarity to movies. But the same 
conclusion follows for the copyrightability of ordinary application pro. 
grams like word processors and spread sheets. The legislative history of 
the Act shows why the conclusion is compelled. The previous Copy-
right Act, enacted in 1909, accorded protection to an ambiguous mixture 
of intangible works and tangible media. The general subject matter was 
"the writings of an author."18 Writings were classified for registration 
purposes as including not only "books ... photographs . .. [and] prints," 
but also "periodicals . .. lectures, sermons ... works of art ... [and] 
dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions."17 The first group sug-
gests tangible objects: books, photographs, and prints are different nu'-
dia . But the second group, "periodicals, lectures, sermons ... works of 
art .. . [and] dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions," consists of 
intangible "works," which can be embodied in any medium. 
Congress eventually became dissatisfied with this mixing of tangi-
ble and intangible concepts into one category.18 The principal drawback 
was that by emphasizing the application of copyright to the known me-
dia of expression in 1909, the old Act could not easily be applied to new 
technological developments. which commonly take th e form of new 
14. 17 U.S.c. § 102. 
15. ~, ~.g. , M . Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 1986): Atari 
v. North Am . P hilips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (1 th Cir.), ~t. denitd, 4~ 
U.S. 880 (1982): S tem E lecs. v . Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982): Midway Mfg. Co. 
v. Dirkschneider, ~3 F. Supp. 466. 479 (0. Neb. 1981). 
16. 1909 Copyright Act, Act of March 4, 1909, ch . 320, 35 Stat. 1075, § 4. 
17. Jd. § 5. 
18. HolUI! Report, &upro note 7, at 51. 
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means of expression-new technological media.19 
Congress reacted to cases such as VYhite-Smith Publishing Co. v. 
Apollo,20 which had found that musical works embodied in the medium 
of player piano rolls could not be copyrighted because they could not be 
read directly by humans. After Mite-Smith's emphasis on the medium 
as the critical copyrightable entity. musical works in non-human reada-
ble form were widely copied and sold.21 Congress was dissatisfied with 
this outcome and determined for the 1976 Act "to avoid the artificial 
and largely unjustifiable distinctions" drawn in U'hite-Smith on the ba-
sis of medium, rather than "work."22 Congress in 1976 deliberately 
turned away from this ambiguous focus to write a statute whose subject 
matter consisted not of known types of media, but on the contrary of 
intangible "works," which could be embodied in any medium "now 
known or later developed."23 
To be sure, copyright protection would not be complete until a par-
ticular work met the test of embodiment or "fixation" in some type of 
medium, but the 1976 Act's 8Ubject matter requirement was left "medi-
umless." The explicit goal of this approach was to allow for new tech· 
nological means of expression to arise and embody works that would 
receive copyright protection without the necessity of amendments to 
the statute.24 Plainly, then, if something is considered a "work of au-
thorship" under the 1976 Act, it is within the subject matter of copy-
right without regard to whether it is embodied in the pages of a book, 
the tracks of a laser disk, or on a computer display. 
One can hardly argue that an author who writes a novel at a com-
19. The history of copyright law hu been one of gradual expansion in the types 
of worM accorded protection , and the subject matter affected by this expansion 
has fallen into two general categori • . In the fint, lcientific discoverie5 and tech· 
nological developmentl have made paulble new fomu of crefltive expression that 
never existed before. In some of these cases the new expreuive forms- . .. com-
puter programs, for example----eould be regarded as an extemion of copyrigh table 
subject matter. Congreu had already intended to protect, and were thus consid-
ered copyrightable from the oulaet without the need of new legislation. 
20. 2Q9 U.S. 1 (1908). 
21 . Houu R~. ,upm note 7, at 21. 
22. TeL.t .52. 
23. 17 U.S.C. § 102. S«: ol#o HoUM: R~, .rupTa note 7, . t 52 ("it makes no differ-
ence what the form, manner, o r medium of fixation may be--whether it is in words, num-
ben, notes, sounlh, pictures, or other graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a 
physical object in written, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any 
other s lable form .... "). The HoWH! &pt;>rl notes that the definitions in section 101 "re_ 
flect a /und.:lmen to l dutinction between the 'original work' wh ich is the product of 'au-
thonhip' and the multitude of material objecu in which it can be embodied. Thus ... a 
'book' is not a work of authorship . .. " but rather a "literary work." TeL at .53 (em phasiJ; 
added). 
24. S«: supra note 23. 
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puter keyboard has failed to create a work within the subject matter of 
copyright. Similarly, the artist who creates a drawing on a computer 
has without question created a work of authorship. a "pictorial work," 
that is within the subject matter of copyright. It is equally clear that a 
company that puts together a series of graphic images. amounts of text, 
animations, etc., for expression on a computer display, has created a 
"work Q/. authorship," either as a literary work. as individual pictorial 
works, as a "collective work" of individual works. or as a single "audio-
visual" work much akin to a movie. Each of these things is explicitly 
listed in the Act as an illustration of copyrightable subject matter ,25 
There can be no other conclusion. in short, but that computer 
screen displays are pictorial, graphic, or audio visual displays, and hence 
fall within the subject matter of the copyright law. The text of the stat~ 
ute is perfectly clear on this point, and is confirmed by the legislative 
history, so that a resort to policy analysis is not called for.26 
B. IBSUe 2: Should Screen. Displays Fall Within Copyright's Subject 
Matter? 
Nonetheless, because commentators so often raise policy objections 
to including screen displays within copyright's subject matter, these pol-
icy arguments may eventually reach the ears of Congress, where they 
are appropriately raised. They therefore merit consideration. 
The usually offered policy grounds for excluding displays from pro-
tection fall into four types: (1) the argument of cost savings; (2) the ar-
gument of compatibility and standards; (3) the argument of progress; 
and (4) the argument of functionality. None of them is persuasive. 
III. THE COST SAVINGS ARGUMENT 
The argument of cost savings is that protection of screen displays 
forces other companies, who have not authored a given screen display, 
to spend time and money developing new ones if they cannot copy from 
existing ones. 
Stating the argument this way should show immediately why 
standing alone, it is no argument at all: it proves far too much. If we 
are to allow copiers free access to works on the grounds that doing so 
will save money, we need not stop with screen displays. Society can 
26. &e 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
26. The rut" of .... tutory construction provide that when a statute's meaning Is dear 
and the legislative history supporta that meaning, courta should not turn to a policy analy-
sis to interpret It. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.s. 886, 895-96 (1983); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 
U.S. 1, 7--8 (1980). Indeed, a judidal willingness to entertain policy arguments when a stat-
ute is obvious renders future statutes, equally obvious, uncertain, and thereby Invites un-
necessary litigation. 
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save even more money by letting copiers copy the latest novels or popu-
lar posters or advertisements or photographs or poetry or record albums 
or anything else. Copying is always cheaper than creating. 
But the affirmative reason we have a copyright law is not to mini-
mize the cost of re-creation; rather it is to provide an incentive for crea-
tion in the first place. Without the copyright incentive, would-be 
creators would be reluctant to invest in creative activity; instead of 
cheaper works. society would have too few. In any event, the argument 
of cost saving is one that could be made for hundreds of creative en-
deavors; but it is one that neither Congress nor the courts should ac-
cept, precisely because it undermines the very incentives that copyright 
law exists to foster. 
IV. NEED-FOR-COMPATIBILITY-THROUGH-STANDARDS ARGUMENT 
The argument about compatibility is similar to the cost savings ar-
gument, but is couched in terms of benefitting the public instead of ben-
efitting the would-be copier. The argument is that making new 
programs "compatible" with accepted standards benefits consumers by 
reducing the time required for users to become familiar with the opera-
tion of the new program. Typical of this argument is the assertion by 
one commentator that not considering the value of standards in a copy-
right case "is to condone or even prescribe making it harder and more 
exasperating for the public to use software. and therefore to slow the 
growth of the software market."n 
Three points need to made here. First. compatibility means several 
different things. most of which do not raise questions about screen dis-
play copyrights at all; second. standardization is a benefit. but neither 
courts nor Congress are well-placed to determine what degree and tim-
ing for standards is optimal; and third, the public can benefit from com-
patibility and standards without courts or Congress denying copyright 
protection for screen displays. 
A. What Does "Compatibility" Mean? 
Software can be compatible with other software in any of several 
ways: it can run "under" another software package; it can run as an 
"add-in" to another software package; it can use data in the same for-
mat as that used by another package; or it can run "instead of" another 
27. Stem, ~pra note 1, at 311. See abo Leeke, Sqjtware Copvri.ght Court Ruling 
Stin Debau, PC WEEK, Dee. 9, 1986, at 59, 68. ~ted in Note. 10 COMMIENT 859, 862 n.14, 
"'pro note 1 (arguing that allowing a monopoly in the screen displays originated by one 
company "might dangeroualy inhibit lOme good trendll in our industry-the natural devel-
opment of standards and the ability of people to take advanu.ge of compatibility to sell 
new products that do new t.hinp.."). 
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software package. The first three are perfectly compatible with copy-
right law; the fourth is not. 
Some programs control the operation of other programs. These 
programs are referred to as "operating systems" or "operating environ-
ments." Typical of these kinds of programs are the Microsoft Corpora-
tion's MS-DOS and Windows, the Apple Corporation's Macintosh 
Finder, the Quarterdeck Corporation's DesqView, the Digital Research 
Corporation's DR-DOS and GEM, and others. 
Operating system programs are conventionally spoken of as run-
ning other programs "under" them. One speaks of a program like the 
Aldus Corporation's "Pagemaker" as running "under" Microsoft Win-
dows, or "Word for the Macintosh" as running "under" the Macintosh 
Finder operating system. 
Other programs run in a sense "along side of" or ''with'' a given 
program. These programs are often referred to as "add-ins" because 
they add new features to another program, operating more or less as if 
they were a part of the latter program. Many companies make pro-
grams that cooperate with Lotus 1-2-3, for example, to add features not 
provided by 1-2-3. Versions of WordPerfect before 5.1, for another ex-
ample, did not provide support for a "mouse" pointing device; several 
companies made products that grafted support for using a "mouse" onto 
that popular word processor. 
None of these examples of programs that run "under" or "along 
side of" other programs constitutes copyright infringement. In the case 
of the programs that run under an operating system like Windows or 
the Macintosh or GEM, to the extent that such programs could be said 
to reproduce the operating system's screen display, permission is whole-
heartedly extended by the operating system company. Third party 
software development is precisely the reason such systems are created 
in the first place. Apple has never, to my knowledge, contemplated 
suing third parties who create programs to run on the Macintosh. 
Neither has Microsoft sued anyone for selling Windows programs, or 
for that matter, programs that run under DOS. 
In the case of programs that run as add-ins to an underlying pro-
gram, infringement is also not a problem because these add-ins do not 
reproduce the underlying display. They may use it, they may take ad-
vantage of it, they may work with it, but they do not make a copy of it 
or perform it or distribute it or do any other infringing activities. They 
no more infringe the underlying program than a plastic dust jacket or 
book mark infringe the novel they are used with.28 
Compatibility is also widely achieved through reliance on common 
28. In fact, l uperior add·In technologie. may end up being licenud and distributed by 
the originating company. Lotus liceIllH!d " Impress," an add-In to Lotus 1·2-3 that en· 
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data file formats. Many database products can read and write data files 
that are stored in the particular format that the market leading "dBase" 
program stores them. Many spreadsheet programs can read and write 
Lotus 1-2-3 formatted data fUes. 
This type of data compatibility is common and is not prevented by 
copyright law29 for very good reasons. A company needs to know that it 
can protect a screen display so that it can determine how much of its 
resources to invest in display design,so One can spend next to nothing 
or a fortune or anything in between on screen display design. But a 
data format offers far fewer options, so that the range of investment 
levels is quite narrow. A program has to have some kind of data for-
mat, and users rarely care exactly what that format is. There is thus no 
need for the incentive of copyright law to protect data format designs. 
Companies have all the incentive they need from the sheer necessity of 
selling their software product.31 
The fourth type of "compatibility" refers to something altogether 
different: some programs are sold as compatible with the screen display 
of another program because they are intended to be used instead 0/ the 
original program. This is the category of "clone" software.32 The Mt> 
saie company's "Twin" program, for example, duplicated the features of 
Lotus 1-2-3; the Softklone company's "Mirror" program at one time du-
plicated the screen display of Digital Communication Associates' 
"Crosstalk" communications program. Parts of the Windows and GEM 
screen displays may have duplicated some of the Macintosh display. 
Clone software potentially does infringe the copyright on an origi-
nal program's screen displays. Cloning's principal justification is that it 
reduces training time," Of course it reduces training time if users al-
ready have training on the original program. It reduces other costs as 
well: scores of training manuals, books, templates, courses, etc. exist for 
Lotus 1-2-3. A clone program that has exactly the same functions and 
screen display as Lotus can "piggy back" on these materials at no cost. 
hances spn!adsheet display and printing quality, from an independent software developer. 
S« PC MAG., July 19!Ml, at 54. 
29. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. Univenity Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1012-
14 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (data (ormata can be copied either because they are unprotectlble 
"Ideas" or because the format's "expression" has merged with Ita ''idea'' and Is therefore 
not copyrightable); accord Plains Cotton Co-op Aa'n v. Goodpasture Computer Se~., 807 
F.2d 1256, l262 (5th Cir.), cert. cknW, 484 U.s. 821 (1987). 
30. For a brief discussion of copyright'. role in channelling investments, see 1 P. 
GoLDSTEIN, CoPYRIGHT §§ 1.2.3.1-1.2.3.2, at 16-20 (1989). 
31. 'I'hla Is obviously a policy argument and would not be necessary if the Copyright 
Act weN! clear about protecting formata. 
32. And arguably this category includes Microloft Windows, which Is sold to a large 
extent 81 an alternative to the Apple Maeinta-h. 
33. S« MeneU,.upro note 1, at 109:i. 
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Compatibility, when it means saving on training time, training 
manuals, the production of templates, etc. is nonetheless not a good rea· 
son to allow copying: this is just the "cost savings" arguments allover 
again and no better justified merely because it appears under a more 
public spirited label. 
Nor is compatibility a good justification when couched in terms of 
"network externalities." An "externality" generally is a cost or benefit 
borne involuntarily, and not felt through a market's price mechanism .34 
The concept of "network externalities" refers to the fact that for some 
products and services, existing users derive a benefit not only from 
their own use of the product, but also from the number of other users 
of the product.35 The best example, and one from which the term "net· 
work" evidently derives,36 is the telephone network. Each telephone 
subscriber enjoys increasing communication benefits as the number of 
other subscribers to the same network reachable by phone grows larger. 
Because the benefits of an increasing number of subscribers accrue 
to existing phone users without their paying for it or without their hav· 
ing a choice about it, the benefits to existing users are "external," i.e., 
not felt through the normal market for buying and selling phone ser· 
vice. New users are only willing to pay for the number of other users 
already on the same network at the time. They will take account, in 
other words, only of the benefits they receive from joining the network; 
they will not take account of (and will not be will ing to pay for ) the 
"external" benefits they confer on existing users. Because those bene-
fits are real to society, the argument goes, some form of subsidy is nec· 
essary to "lure" growing numbers of users to join the network. 
Applied to screen displays, the argument for standardization is that 
additional users for a given display bring "network" benefits to existing 
users by adding to the number of training materials, templates, etc.31 
Because it is difficult to subsidize new users of a program's screen dis· 
plays directly, an indirect subsidy can be obtained by allowing other 
firms to copy an originating firm 's screen displays.38 The lower cost of 
the copied displays is in effect the subsidy. 
3<4. 5« R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAw ... NO EcoNOMICS 4~6 ( 988). 
35. See generally the economic analysis in Kal:t & Shapiro, Ndwork EZlV1Ialitiu. 
Com~tition. and Compatibility, 75 AM. EcoN. REV. 424 (1985). 
36. The term appear. to have been lint uaed in Kat:t & Sh apiro, supra note 35. 
37. 5« Menell , supra note 1 at 1066-71; 1095-98 (1989) (diacussing the extemalitiea N ' 
lOciated with standard user-computer interfaces); Menell. Tailoring lAr1a1 Protection for 
Compu~ SoftwG", 39 STAN. L. R EV. 13229, 13<40-45, 1357-63 (987) (diSCUQing the po$itive 
externalities associated with "operating s}':Item" software). 
38. O r more generally by reducing the scope of screen display protection. Menell ar-
gues, for example, that a non-standard IlCreen disp lay should receive copyright protection, 
but that the protection be forfeited if the display becomes a de facto s tandard. 5« MenelJ, 
supra note 1 at 1098.1102. 
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Though superficially attractive as a rationale for allowing dimin-
ished protection for screen displays. the "network externalities" argu-
ment fails. The argument as applied to screen displays is no different 
from saying that economies of scale can lower costs. If all food shop-
pers, for example, could be required to shop at two or three grocery 
stores instead of several, the chosen (standard) stores could grow in size 
and achieve economies of scale enabling them to lower prices. That is 
not a sound argument. however, for requiring all consumers to choose 
from a diminished selection of stores. 
The argument is not sound because stores are free to consolidate 
and achieve scale economies on their own. If they think the lower 
prices from larger scale operations will more than offset the loss of con-
sumers' choices in store locations, they will consolidate. In just the 
same way. the developer of an original set of screen displays can "con-
solidate" by keeping prices low initially to attract a large number of ini-
tial buyers. 
Indeed, many new entrants to the software market do just that: 
they charge a discounted initial price, with price increases phased in as 
the product's market (and its value to users) grows. In economic terms, 
the originator of the screen displays can capture the benefits that come 
from economies of scale. By capturing them, the originator internalizes 
them, and they are no longer "externalities" and no longer justify a 
subsidized lower price to consumers.39 
A final way to look at the compatibility issue is to note that if com-
patibility were a good justification, it should apply in the trademark 
context as well: a company could argue that it needed its new trade-
mark to be "compatible" with another company's existing trademark, so 
that the new company could take advantage of all the advertising that 
the original company had done. 
It would certainly make it easier for a small start-up company to 
39. Menell himself oontradi.cta the notion that any "externalities" are pnsent in the 
sc:reen display market. He note. that "Computer-u.er interface. [a broad phrase that in. 
cludes sc:reen displaYI] generate network externalities to the extent that l tandardization 
producetl larger networb and redUcetl retraining and mobility castl." Menell, supra note 
1, at 1095. But paradoxically he also obMrves that '"!'he owner of a de facto industry stan-
dard could reap the value consumers place on l tandardiz.ation through monopoly pricing." 
Id. at 1094. But if the owner of the lk facto ltandard can capture the value of I tandardiUl-
tion, where '- the "externality?" 
The fallacy in Menell'l arrument is that screen displays are not like telephone net· 
work externalities: existing telephone u.en receive growing benefitl as new users join 
the network. Existing.creen display u.ers do not receive growing benefits Il$ others also 
begin using the urne screen displaya; rather they are attracted. to make their initial 
purdlax because of the larJe number of other existing users. Because the "external ben-
efitl" are known at the time of purchase, both buyer and seller can take them Into ac-
count through the price mechanism and thus they are not "external" at all. 
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compete in the oil business if it could call its gasoline "Exxon." Because 
the same advertising would apply to both the original Exxon and the 
copier, and hence would be spread out over a larger base of goods and 
services, the cost of advertising would fall. Consumers would also be 
spared the cost of investigating the quality of the competing Exxon 
company because they would already be familiar with the Exxon 
trademark. 
The absurdity of these arguments-which are paraphrases of the 
arguments made to allow screen displays to be copied-show why the 
laller arguments are not persuasive: both trademark and copyright law 
are designed to prevent this sort of free riding on the success of others. 
B. Standarization Is Not W ell Suited To Judicial or Congressional 
Decision 
Merely reducing training time or increasing economies of scale, 
then, like any bald assertion of cost savings, is not a sufficient justifica. 
tion for allowing screen displays to be copied at will . Nevertheless, one 
has a sense that standards are important; perhaps at some point, the 
cost savings from standardization might become so large as to overcome 
the loss in originators' incentives to create new screen display expres· 
sions in the first place. 
That point is absolutely correct, but it in no sense justifies the de· 
nial of copyright for computer screen displays. The important questions 
about standardization are not the abstract ones of standardization's de-
sirability, but rather: who should decide when standards are finally de· 
sirable, and how should they decide it? These are questions that 
neither Congress nor the courts are well placed to determine. They in· 
volve costs and benefits and the desires of computer users, and are thus 
best suited to a determination in the marketplace, by the aggregate 
purchasing decisions of thousands of individual buyers. 
Happily, software publishers themselves have every incentive to 
reach the socially optimal decision about standardization, as long as 
they possess well defined and enforceable property rights in screen dis· 
plays. At first blush, strong property rights in screen displays appear to 
be consistent with the policy of incentives for research, but inconsistent 
with the policy of compatibility through widely·adopted standards. In 
fact they are consistent with both policies for this reason: strong prop-
erty rights enable widespread licensing of display technologies. 
How does this work? A company that sees the value for users of a 
standard screen display, like that for Lotus 1.2.3, can approach Lotlll 
and offer a royalty payment in exchange for the righ t to use the Lot lll 
display. For Lotus, this is money in the bank, earned at the very nomi· 
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nal cost of negotiating a licensing agreement. Lotus therefore has a 
strong incentive to reach agreement on such a license. 
Of course, Lotus might decide that it could make more money by 
selling its own software. worrying that a clone package would cut into 
its markel. But two things prevent that outcome from being trouble-
some. First, any cut into Lotus's own market can be compensated for 
by the royalty arrangement. The royalty payments need only be higher 
than Lotus's net revenue loss to the clone market. 
Second. if Lotus's calculations of an appropriate royalty amount 
yield a figure that is higher than any cloning company is willing to pay, 
then a license agreement will not be reached-but in this situation, it 
should not be reached because the public is better off with only Lotus 
selling the 1·2-3 screen display: Lotus can make more money from be-
ing the exclusive seller of the 1-2-3 display only if the public prefers 
buying the original 1-2-3 from Lotus to buying the same display from a 
clone maker. 
If the public does prefer buying from Lotus itself, that fact strongly 
suggests that the Lotus screen display may function as more than a dis-
play-it could be a h-ademark.40 Trademark significance means that 
the public expects a consistent level of quality from the product. In 
that case, Lotus could not license its screen display to others without 
taking steps to guarantee to the buying public the same level of quality, 
including technical support, from the licensee that Lotus provides its 
own customers:u This guarantee would be impossible for Lotus to 
make on behalf of a clone company that wrote its own programming 
code and provided its own technical support. In that event, Lotus 
should not license its screen display-nor should a court or Congress 
compel it to do so. 
In practice, as long as the screen display does not have trademark 
significance, it is likely that Lotus can make more money by licensing, 
because clone software constitutes a distinct market with distinct pric-
ing. Users who prefer to buy clone software are those who are unable 
to pay the high price that market-leading software commands, but who 
are willing to pay a lower price for a product with less technical support 
and lower assurances of quality. Lotus itself would have difficulty set-
oW. 5« gennullJl Rudnick, Window Iftusing; 1'radnnark Protection for CornpufC 
~ DirpUlJl' and Sciftwo.l"t, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 382 (1990) (discU5$ing trademarks on 
"operating system" IOftWIU"I!!) . 
41. See Transgo, Inc. v. A;ac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1017, cert. fh· 
"W, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986): Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat. Bank, 696 F.2d 
1371, 1377, cert. dniW, SouthTrult Bank of Alabama v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc., 464 U.S. 826 
(1982); Reddy Com., Inc. v. Environmental Action Found., 477 F. Supp. 936, 944 (1979). 
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ling separate prices for these separate markets,42 but by licensing clone 
vendors, it can achieve the effect of separate pricing. 
The fact that Lotus and other software producers have chosen to 
sue clone makers. not license them, does not contradict this analysis. 
For one thing, the clone makers may not have approached Lotus ini-
tially. For another, it is possible that for some software, market seg-
mentation is not helpful because the public greatly prefers buying 
screen displays from the display's originator. Lotus is, after all, in the 
best position to know whether licensing or not licensing is more profita-
ble. Remember that if licensing is not more profitable, that fact is a sig-
nal to Lotus that the public puts a greater value on buying the original 
than on buying a clone. In that case, a license should not be granted 
and Lotus itself should be the exclusive seller of the 1-2-3 screen 
display. 
Finally, Lotus may be wrong in this particular instance and actually 
be making less money than it might make by licensing. But that does 
not mean that the copyright law should be changed so that screen dis-
plays are uncopyrightable. It means rather that companies, like all of 
us, sometimes make mistakes. Even if this particular instance is a mis-
take, eventually companies like Lotus will figure out the cost effective 
thing to do and do it. Allowing copyright to apply to computer displays 
is essential for this beneficial long·run result to obtain. 
Eliminating the copyright on screen displays on grounds of "com· 
patibility" is therefore a red. herring. The compatibility of application 
programs with operating environments is wholly encouraged by the de. 
veloper of the environment; the use of add·ins to "standard" programs 
is not an infringement; the use of another company's "standard" data 
file format is not an infringement. 
Selling a copied display to be used instead of a widely·used original 
display is infringement. If the public would truly benefit from cloned 
software packages that run "instead of" the original. then it will be in 
the originating company's best interests to reach a licensing and royalty 
agreement with the clone makers. If the public values screen displays 
more highly when they come from the originating company, then the 
originator will not license the display-nor should it. In no event does 
the public benefit from having weakened. vague, or non-existent copy-
right protection for computer screen displays. 
V. SLQW·THE·PROGft.ESS.OF-5CREEN DISPLAY·DESIGN ARGUMENT 
The argument is sometimes made that software companies, fearing 
liability, will not bother to develop improvements to others' screen dis-
42. It would have difficult !letting dhpuate prices because buyers in the cheaper mar· 
ket could turn around and re-eell to the higher priced market. 
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play designs. "[I]f companies are afraid to go to market with what they 
think are incremental, but distinct, improvements on 8 basic design. we 
will become a stagnant industry bounded by the usual and comforta-
ble,""s The point made here, and echoed by others," is that technology 
improves in incremental steps. not all of which are likely to emerge 
from the same company. With strong copyright protection on displays, 
the argument goes, non-originating companies will be reluctant to in-
vest in these step--by-step improvements becaUse they will face copy-
right liability for using them. 
Once again, this argument misses the mark entirely. Suppose the 
Acme company creates a better design for the Macintosh in the form of 
an incremental improvement. Assume that copyright law prevents 
Acme from selling the Macintosh screen display with their improve-
ments because too much of the protected Macintosh display must be 
copied to allow the improvements to operate. 
Is this bad? Certainly Dot: if small, "incremental" changes were 
enough to allow 8 company to copy another company's entire screen dis-
play without paying royalties, then every software developer in the land 
would make trivial changes to popular displays and begin to clone prod. 
ucts. The disincentive to originating software companies to invest in the 
development of screen display would be immense. They simply would 
not do it. 
Is the public hurt, then, if developers' fear of lawsuits prevents 
them from selling screen displays with incremental changes? Not at all. 
Once again, if there is value in an improved screen display for the Mac-
intosh, the public will be willing to pay for it (that is how we know it 
has value). If the public is willing to pay for it, then Acme can obtain a 
license from Apple and pay for the license with the profits from sales to 
a willing public. 
I! Apple will not license the Macintosh display to Acme, then Acme 
can license its incremental improvements to Apple. I! there is a public 
demand for these improvements, there is nothing to prevent Apple and 
Acme from getting together and agreeing on a royalty arrangement one 
way or the other. 
Of course, if screen displays were not copyrightable in the first 
place, then neither an original display nor incremental improvements 
by other developers would be protected, so that no one would have an 
incentive to create anything, whether fundamental or incremental. 
That would benefit neither originating companies, companies making 
improvements, nor the public. 
43. WUlt.ana, A Thn!Ut to FuNre Sqjhoore, BYTE, Jan. 1986, at 6. 
44. $ft, e.g., Samuebon, nlpn.! note 3; Note, (;qpvright Protection for Computer 
.sc.-n DUplllY6, 72 MINN. 1.. REv. 1123, 1153 (1988). 
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VI. ScREEN DISPLAYS ARE FUNCTIONAL. NOT ARTISTIC 
Lawyers writing on copyright law often raise the objection, more 
sophisticated than the previous objections, that computer program 
screen displays are functional or "utilitarian" and hence that they 
should not receive the same protection that, say. a painting or novel or 
movie would receive.4& A variation on this argument is the assertion 
that displays are appropriate for patent protection, which is designed 
for technology, but not for copyright protection, which is designed for 
artistic expression.-t8 
These, too, are pointless arguments. Copyright protection has long 
been applied to functional or utilitarian works, and there is no reason to 
discontinue this satisfactory practice. Second, the reasons that copy-
right and patent protection differ have little to do with the differences 
between art and technology, but a lot to do with the differences be-
tween intangible information and tangible things. On either ground, 
screen displays fall clearly into the copyright category. 
Most copyrightable things are utilitarian and receive protection 
without the slightest quibble: maps, car repair books, commercials and 
advertisements. encyclopedias, dictionaries. cook books. instruction 
manuals-all these are utilitarian, yet copyrightable. No one seriously 
argues that these things, long the subject of copyright. should be denied 
copyright's simple and effective form of protection."? 
Nor is the application of copyright to functional works a recent 
turn of events. When members of the Constitutional Convention were 
writing the Constitution, with its copyright and patent clauses. nearly 
all printed materials that originated in the United States were func-
tional in the sense of conveying factual data, not artistic or literary ex· 
pression.a American arts and letters were undeveloped; American 
~. &e Samuebon,.rupro note 3~ Stem,.rupro note I , at 311 (expressing concem that 
''utilitarian aspects" of screen dUlpla~ mtght be protected); Fonten, It Wal," ana Tal'" 
LiM M¥ Duck, So How CorM It. Not In/ri~t?: 11u! Que Agoinllt ''LoowM-Feel'' 
Protection /01' Computer Progrn'fM, 70 JF>TOS 639, 662 (1988) (utilitarian argument im-
plicit in dbcussian of progl'llDa as "technological goo<k"). 
46. &e Samuelson, .rupro note 3. 
47. To be lure, the Supreme Court'l decision bt FNt hblwtioJU, Inc. v. Ruml Te~ 
~ Senrict' Ca, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) eliminated copyright protection for telephone 
boob and by implication for any utilitarian work created by labor and effort without orig-
lnality of expreuion. Neverthelesa, courts have not extended FeUt beyond utilitarian 
worb whose arrangement is predetermined and thus for which the creator has essen-
tially no scope for originality whatever. 5«, e.g., Kreg<lll v. Aaociated Press, 937 F.2d 700 
(2d Cir. 1991); Bellsouth Advertlsing &. Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly Information Pub-
lishing Co., 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991); and the discussion of these cases in Gm.burg, No 
"Sweut"? Copyright and Other Protecrnm qf WOTkI qf Il'\fornwtkm qJttT Feist v. Rural 
Telephone, 92 CoLUM.. L. REv. 338, 347, 352 (1992). 
48. Set Gm.burg, A 10k qf Two CopIIright3: Litemrv ProptTtjJ in RevolutWnal1l 
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novels barely ex.iste<! j49 poetry, painting, sculpture, drame all these 
must have been far less significant to American culture than they are 
now. 
To be sure, works of art, music, and literature were appreciated and 
imported from abroad. And just as surely, the writers of the Constitu-
tion could look forward to an American presence in the art world and 
could wisely provide for its later emergence. But in the late 18th cen-
tury, American publishers already put out utilitarian works in 
abundance.1IO 
It would have been perverse indeed for the Founders to write a 
Constitutional provision that was intended to exclude the very func-
tional works that made up the bulk of American intellectual property 
output, yet was intended to apply to artistic works. works that at the 
time made up an insignificant fraction of that Qutput.ln 
The first Copyright statute, enacted just one year after the Consti-
Inmce and AI'MTica, 64 'I'ULANE 1.. REv., 991, lQ02...()5 (1990), Ginsbura notes that the l.te 
18th century record of copyright deposita featured an overwhelming preponderance of 
"instructive, clvlcs-orlented workl" web u newspapers, and tItlN In poUt1eaI. science, tu.-
tory, and social .cIence. Iii at 1002. r- than ten pen:ent of the fint deaode', copyright 
deposiu were for novelL Iii (calculated). More pointedly me ob.ervet that "copyright 
was sought for the socially ta4u~ tMtructhle worb that Congreu had Intended to en· 
courage." Iii at 1003 (emphull added). Th_ worb were primarily textboob. Iii Even 
two of the earUNt litigated copyright cues dealt with functional worD: a PHARMAco-
POEIA OF THE UNITED SrATD; OF AMERICA. and records of Supreme Court opln1om. Iii at 
1005. 
49. Although which work should be oontidered. the "first Ameriean novel" is a matter 
for d.bipute, • prime contender for that title is William Hill Brown's THE PoWER OF SYM-
PATHY, published in 1789. See P. PARKER, EARLy AMERICAN FicnON :xW, xv (1984). One 
literary historlan summed up scholarly atUtudel toward American literature of the late 
18th and early 1!Jth centuriel tlu. way: 
The country was too yoUll8 to have a literature of iU own. Ita lnhabltanu were 
too much preoc:c:upled with qUestiON of lurvival or with ambitious political ca-
reen or with trying to get rich quicldy to write thelIl$t!JveI or to IUpport the ef· 
forti of the few that wrote. They had no atandarcb and no ability to recognize 
good writing, not did they undentand the value of a nationalllterature. 
H. PEITER, THE EARLy AMERICAN NOVEL 11 (1971). 
The author of thiI observation notes that many critics have objected to thiI dismaJ. 
cbanw:terizatlon of American letten at the turn of the 18th century, but that these objec-
tiON themHlves "tended . .. to confirm the majority view [ntherJ than to constitute con_ 
vincing counterargwnents." Iii 
One English commentator of 1820, Sidney Smith, asked _thingly "In the four 
quarters of the globe, who reads an American book? or goes to an American play?" 33 
EDINBURGH REv. 79 (1820), quot«i in H. PETrER., .upM at 4-5. This Indictment became 
famoU& enough that the Supreme Court quoted It almost a hundred yean later in United 
l>ictWtKlr., Co. v. G. &- o. M~m Co., 208 U.S. 260, 264 (1908). 
50. See Glmburg,.upM note 48, at 1002-04. 
51. Foreign literature, principally English, did exist in the United States but Willi de-
nied cop)lriiht protection for over a century after the lint U.s. cop)'riiht enactment. until 
the International Cop)lriiht Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1106. 
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tution,52 confirms that this perverse interpretation was not intended. 
The 1790 Act applied. only to maps, charts, and books.53 Two-thirds of 
the statute's subject matter-maps and charts-was explicitly utilita· 
rian; the remaining one-third-books-was neither utilitarian nor artis-
tic on its face. but as the preceding discussion shows. was markedly 
utilitarian in practice at the time. two Strikingly, much notable artistic 
output of the late Eighteenth century-music, painting, and drama---
was not explicitly protected by the first copyright law.s:! 
The history of the American copyright system, then, flatly contra· 
diets arguments that copyright should apply to artistic, not functional, 
works. If anything, copyright was designed more for the latter than for 
the former. 
A Copyrights Versus Patents 
History is thus on the side of copyright for functional. utilitarian 
works. Yet, a question remains as to how to reconcile copyright protec-
tion for utilitarian works with patent protection on what appears to be 
the same type of works. Should these two very different forms of pro-
tection ~xist in the same work? 
The answer is that they do not. We often think of copyright as ap-
plying to "art," and patents to "technology," but this view is misleading. 
Patent protection is primarily applicable to tangible things.56 Copyright 
applies primarily (though certainly not exclusively) to ·'works"-intan· 
gible things that do not depend on any particular tangible medium of 
expression. 
This distinction makes sense: in general. "works" are a form of in-
formation. Information has always been faster and cheaper to copy and 
use, and therefore requires a faster and cheaper means of legal protec-
tion than, say, tangible personal property. Copying, i.e., manufacturing. 
an invention is usually costlier and more difficult than copying books or 
maps. Modest inventions can be left unprotected. by patent law because 
copying will be discouraged by the costs of a copier's going into the 
52. Act of May 31. 1190, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
53. fa. 
5.(. See Text accompanying note 48. 
55. Musical compositions were not added until 1831 (Act of Feb. 3, 1831, c. 16, 4 Stat. 
436). Paintings and drawings were expressly included in copyright's subject matter only 
in 1870 (see Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 Stat. 198), having been ~ as explicit copy-
right subject matter by Cortgre$$ when earlier pro~ in 1824. See S. 77, 18th CoIl(., bt 
Sess. (1824). 
56. Of course, patent law applies to processes .. well .. tangible machines, articles of 
manufacture, and compositions of matter. ProceueJ are intangible. But the value of a 
Procell!!l lies in its use. and the use of a procesJ always entails lOme mechanical or chemical 
or other tangible thing. 
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manufacturing business.s')' Bigger (and more profitable) advances in 
technology will justify a major expense by the would-be copier, and ac-
cordingly are prevented by a more extensive. and costlier, form of pro-
tection-patents. 
The better way to look at the "art vs. technology" distinction is 
therefore to see that it is, broadly speaking, a distinction between those 
things that take the form of intangible works of information-relatively 
cheap to copy-and those that take the form. of tangible objects-rela-
tively expensive to copy. 
The very sluggish pace of the patenting process also argues against 
patents for screen displays. Most software, whether computer pro-
grams, or screen displays, or entire user-computer interfaces, has 8 ~ 
luI life measured in years, not decades or lifetimes. This observation 
seems to cut against copyright protection because of copyright's "life of 
the author plus fifty years" duration. But the long tail of copyright pro-
tection has essentially no effect either wayan works with short life 
spans like screen displays, so it is irrelevant to the issues. If a screen 
display is still protected twenty-five or thirty years after everyone has 
stopped using it, then who cares if it is still in copyright? 
What is relevant and what we should care about is the amount of 
time it takes to get protection in the first place. With copyright, that 
time is negligible. With patent law, it is substantial. The average time 
to get a patent in the United States today is above two years. Worse, 
the average is not indicative of the possible upper limits. Recently, an 
inventor received a patent on a semiconductor computer chip after a 
twenty year application process!58 
U screen displays are to be protected by patent law, what is a 
would-be competitor/copier of displays supposed to do: gamble that a 
patent will not be issued on the original displays and bring out a copied 
display, running the risk that if a patent is in fact issued, all invest-
ments in production and marketing will be lost? Or wait to see whether 
a patent will be issued or not, which in practice means waiting at least 
two to three years qfter the time when it becomes apparent that an 
originating company's displays are popular and approaching the status 
of a standard? Neither course of action is attractive or practical pre-
cisely because computer technology and consequently screen displays 
are rapidly changing. 
Seen in this light, computer screen displays fall plainly on the side 
57. Patent law accompliahetl thia through the "nonobviOU$" requirement. earlier cut 
in the form of the "invention" or "flash of genius" requirement. 5ft 35 U.s.C. § 103, dz... 
~ in Graham v. J ohn Deen! Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
~. ~ Pollack , Compon)l Newa.· A Chip Patent /, Granted That Mall Rewrite Hz... 
tory, N.Y. nMES. Aug. 30, 1990, at Dl. 
392 COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI 
of informational works and copyright protection: they can relatively 
cheaply be duplicated like almost any computer software,59 and they 
change rapidly and so need a means for quickly-acquired protection. 
Applying the costly and time-consuming patent law system to these 
technologies makes little sense. 
VII. DIFFERENCE IN SCOPE OF PROTECTION 
To say that copyright applies to functional works is not to say, of 
course, that courts ought to be indifferent to differences in degrees of 
functionality. They ought not and are not: the scope of copyright pro--
tection that courts give to a given work depends on the extent to which 
the work is artistic or utilitarian. More artistic works customarily get 
greater protection; more utilitarian ones get less.60 But this is not be-
cause of some prejudice in favor of the fine arts and against information 
technology; rather it is because functional works offer less room for in-
dividual variations in expression than artistic works. 
A cook book is more constrained in its expression than a novel be-
cause a cook book mU3t convey certain information; a novel's author has 
a wider scope for expression of plot and character. A map is more con-
strained in what it shows than a work of abstract art. A blueprint has 
less room for authorial interpretation than a sketch of an imaginary 
building's exterior. Because copyright protects expression, the greater 
an author's contribution to expression, the more extensive the copy-
right protection accorded it. 
These observations about constraints on expression in utilitarian 
works are a far cry from saying that utilitarian works either do not re-
ceive or should not receive copyright protection at all. They do and 
they should, to the extent that they are works of information and de-
pend for incentives to their creation on a relatively cheap and easy 
means of protection. Computer displays are no more nor less utilitarian 
or functional than maps, charts, cookbooks, or blueprints; like them, 
displays are easily duplicated works of information; and there is accord-
ingly every reason to include screen displays within the bounds of the 
subject matter of copyright. 
59. Software utilities are widely avallable that take "snapshots" of a computer screen, 
and then produce the programming code necessary to recreate that screen snapshot 
afmh. 
60. See 2 P. GoLDSTEIN, CoPYRIGHT § 8.4, a t 97 & n.3 and accompanying text ("courts 
generally protect minimally expressive fact worlu against only literal or dOlle to literal 
appropriation .... [Clourts take generally the same approach to functional works"). 
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A. Issue 3: Can a particular screen display be copyrighted? (the test-
oj-protection question) 
The third major issue arising from copyright protection on com-
puter screen displays is not the legal one of copyrightable subject m.at-
ter, nor the policy question of whether screen displays ought to fall 
within copyright's subject matter, but the more factual one of whether a 
particular display meets the copyright tests of originality and fixation. 
Fixation is never a problem with commercial software. By defini-
tion, if a screen display is sold in the marketplace it must be fixed in 
the form of program code, if not in the form of drawings or video-taped 
images. Indeed, the Copyright Office only requires a deposit and regis-
t ration for program code, and the Office will use that registration to 
cover the visual displays of the software as well.61 
The more significant question is whether a given display is suffi-
ciently original to sustain copyright protection. The answer to that 
question turns on several factual inquiries, including the complexity of 
the screen designs; the degree of originality of screen designs; the fact 
that ideas do not get protection; and the extent to which the screen de-
sign is dictated by functional considerations. 
The complexity of the screen. A screen with nothing but a handful 
of words on it will not be copyrightable, just as short phrases or titles 
are not copyrightable in general. The addition of graphic artwork to 
text helps avoid the problem of too-trivial a design and is a factor in 
copyrightability, but is not dispositive. Fears that simple textual lists 
will be copyrightable in a computer screen display are unfounded; ordi-
nary copyright principles of originality will prevent that result, without 
need for the removal of screen displays from copyrightable subject 
matter. 
In short, even though "screen displays" in general are copyright-
able subject matter, a particular display may be so simple that it will 
fail to receive protection.62 
61. "The Copyright Office has consistently held the view that a single registration is 
sufficient to protect the copyright in a computer program, including related screen dis-
plays, without a separate registration for screen displays or reference to the displays in 
the 'nature of authorship' description on the application. An application may give a gen-
eral description such as 'entire work' or 'computer program'. This description would 
cover any copyrightable authorship contained in the computer program and screen dis-
plays, regardless of whether identifying material for the screens is deposited. . . . [I]n 
June 1988 the office announced a decision to require that all copyrightable expression em-
bodied in a computer program owned by the same claimant, including computer screen 
displays, be registered on a single application form." Registration Policies for Screen Dis-
plays Clarified (opinion letter, August 25, 1989, and copyright office screen display leaf-
let), [1989] Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 20,559, at 11,491 (display leaflet). 
62. "[C]opyright cannot be secured for names, titles, and phrases such as column 
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The degree of originality. Graphic "icons" such as trash cans 
should receive exactly the same protection they get when reproduced in 
pen-and-ink drawings: if the art work is original, it is protected. Square 
boxes into which users insert check marks on-screen will get no protec-
tion because square boxes have long existed on paper and there is noth-
ing original about them. 
Naturally there will be a wide range of in-between cases, but the 
point is that drawings and text on a computer screen are drawings and 
text. There is simply no reasoned argument that a drawing or body of 
text on a screen differs in originality, and hence in copyright conse-
quences, from the same thing on a piece of paper. 
The fact that ideas do not get protection. The copyright distinction 
between idea and expression is too well known to bear extended discus-
sion here.63 Suffice to say that copyright applies only to the expression 
of ideas, not to the ideas themselves. An "idea" is something one can 
talk about and understand, but that still has a wide array of possible 
embodiments. One can speak of "a painting of a vase of flowers," for 
example, without conveying anything about what a particular painting 
of a vase of flowers looks like. Obviously, the "idea" of painting such a 
picture cannot be copyrighted, though particular paintings can be. 
In just that same way, one can speak of a screen display that uses 
"icons, windows, animation, sound, and menus," without conveying any-
thing about what such a display actually looks like. All these concepts 
are "ideas" because a variety of means of expressing them are available. 
Nearly all the features of programs that people like to talk about are 
liked or talked about at the level of ideas and for that reason cannot be 
protected by copyright. In addition to the obvious "ideas" like icons (in-
cluding the idea of "three-dimensional"icons), windows, etc., other non-
copyrightable ideas include "moving bar" menus as used by Lotus 1-2-3; 
pop-up (or down) menus; a "rubber-band box" for indicating a variable 
sized area on the screen; "tear-off" menus that remain on-screen and 
can be moved around; menus that pop-up at the location of the mouse 
cursor instead of at a fixed location; RAM-resident programs that over-
lay the current screen; and hundreds more. 
As long as talking about these concepts does not determine the way 
headings, simple checklists, and the like, nor can it be secured for the format, arrange-
ment, or typography of a blank form or similar work. Thus, in general, menu screens and 
similar functional interfaces consisting of words or brief phrases in a particular format are 
not registrable." Registration Policies for Screen Displays Clarified (opinion letter, Au-
gust 25, 1989, and copyright office screen display leaflet), [1989] Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 
~ 20,559, at 11,490 (opinion letter). 
63. See, e.g., Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984). See generally 1 P . GoLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.2.2.4 
at 16 (1989). 
1992] COMPUTER SCREEN DISPLAYS 395 
they actually look on the screen, they are "ideas" and cannot be pro-
tected.64 Nothing in the above discussion, for example, describes the 
way that the listed concepts appear on the screen; that means they are 
indeed "ideas" that can freely be used by others. 
The extent to which the screen layout is dictated by functional con· 
siderations. To the extent that such concepts do sometimes dictate ap-
pearance when implemented on a computer screen, however, they 
cannot be protected by copyright. This result follows from the Baker v. 
Selden 65 case of over a hundred years ago. Baker said that the forms 
used in a double entry accounting system were dictated by the double 
entry method of accounting itself, and hence that the forms could not 
receive copyright protection. The case stands for the broader proposi-
tion that whenever the expression of an otherwise copyrightable work 
is dictated by its function, the work cannot receive copyright protection. 
Baker means today that if a given feature of a screen display is dic-
tated by functional requirements, it cannot be copyrighted. Suppose 
that human factors research were to show, for example, that the easiest 
command menus to understand are horizontal, appear across the top of 
the screen, begin with capital letters, and contain no more than five 
terms at a time. If that were a demonstrated research result, no one 
could copyright a menu insofar as it fit that description because the ex-
pression-horizontal menus, five terms, etc.-would be dictated by the 
functional requirement of ease of understanding. And when expression 
is dictated by functional requirements, the Baker v. Selden "merger"66 
doctrine prevents the application of copyright. 
When screen designs are not dictated by functional considerations, 
that means there are a variety of designs to accomplish any given set of 
functions. When there are a variety of designs, that means any of them 
can be original and hence copyrightable. 
Most, if not all, of the benefits of new ideas in screen display de-
64. Indeed, articles in the trade press that are comprehensible without the addition of 
accompanying screen display illustrations are almost necessarily confined to a discussion 
of uncopyrightable ideas, not expression. 
65. 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99 (1879). 
66. "Merger" refers to the fact that when an uncopyrightable "idea" is inextricably 
bound up with, i.e., "merged" with, the "expression" of that idea, the expression cannot be 
copyrighted. To allow a copyright in that situation would provide a monopoly on the un· 
derlying idea, a protection for which the costs would exceed the benefits. For illustrations 
of this principle, see Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th 
Cir. 1971); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967); Matthew 
Bender & Co., Inc. v. Kluwer Law Book Publishers, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 107, 109-110 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). A similar idea is that standard literary devices (scenes a faire) cannot be 
protected by copyright. See See v. Durang, 711 F .2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983); Hoehling v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 
(1980). 
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sign, in other words, will be freely available to all who will take the 
time to design their particular appearance with some originality. Here 
again, routine application of the traditional copyright requirement of 
originality to screen displays ensures that this is so. 
B. Issue 4: Is a particular screen display infringed by another 
particular screen display? (the infringement question) 
The only really difficult issue for litigation, after the questions of 
subject matter and originality have been answered, is whether a given 
screen display is infringed by another. This question has to be an-
swered by comparing the two displays side by side. Unlike the question 
of copyright's subject matter, about which the legislative history has a 
lot to say, the question of infringement is not worth discussing in an es-
say like this one precisely because it is fact dependant. 
At best one can say, as noted earlier,67 that because they are func-
tional, screen displays will not get as broad a scope of protection as 
works of fine art. But at bottom, one must conclude that like all ques-
tions of infringement, the judgements called for in cases of screen dis-
play infringement may be easy or difficult, but in no event can they be 
made in the abstract, by talking about the copyrightability of "screen 
displays" in the subject matter sense. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Courts and commentators facing the question of copyright protec-
tion for computer screen displays have too often failed to distinguish 
copyright policy from copyright law. They have further failed to distin-
guish among the three essential questions inherent in any copyright liti-
gation: what is the scope of copyright's subject matter; are the 
copyright tests of originality and fixation satisfied in the given case; and 
does the defendant's use of computer screen displays infringe the plain-
tiff's copyright rights. 
Copyright policy only comes into play when the Copyright Act is 
not clear. The only possible statutory uncertainty regarding screen dis-
plays would concern their inclusion within copyright's subject matter: 
are they "works of authorship?" But even here there is no uncertainty: 
despite their relatively new technology, they fit very comfortably into 
the existing categories of copyrightable works, either as literary works 
(for primarily textual screen displays), or as pictorial works (for pri-
marily graphic screens), or as audio-visual works (for sequences of 
graphical images). 
Moreover, Congress intended that each new technological medium 
67. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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not require the courts to ure-invent the copyright wheel" by making de-
terminations of copyrightability on a clean slate. Rather, Congress in-
tended that copyright be applied to "works," not to particular media; 
hence each new medium that technology creates need not cause a judi-
cial search for Congressional intent or underlying policy, but merely a 
determination whether some type of otherwise copyrightable work can 
be embodied in the new medium. 
Even if a policy analysis were called for, that analysis would plainly 
show that screen displays belong within copyright's protection. The 
need to encourage investment in screen displays dictates some form of 
protection, but that protection will not be to the detriment of the public 
and its need for standardization. The ready availability of licensing for 
displays with royalty payments to the originator allows the public to ob-
tain all the benefits of standardization, minimization of training costs, 
and familiarity, without subtracting from developers' incentives for 
creation. 
A policy analysis is therefore not called for on the subject matter 
question, nor is any other copyright question of law regarding displays 
even remotely uncertain. The attempt by litigating parties, the encour-
agement of the attempt by commentators, and the acceptance of the at-
tempt by courts, to raise fundamental policy issues regarding the scope 
of copyright in screen displays has only encouraged wasteful litigation 
on a matter that is about as certain as statute or policy can make it. 
The only questions of interest regarding displays are the primarily 
factual ones of originality and fixation-the latter hardly worth discus-
sion because an unfixed display is not a practical possibility-and the 
very factual question whether a defendant's display infringed the plain-
tiff's rights in its own display. These are questions that can be an-
swered only in the context of a particular case, with a close examination 
of particular screen displays. 
If courts would keep these distinctions of copyright policy, law, sub-
ject matter, and tests in mind, we would have greater certainty in the 
law, more productive investment in the development of improved 
screen displays, wide-spread acceptance and use of screen display stan-
dards, and far less wasteful litigation. 
